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Virtue and the Evaluation
of Character
Jacqueline Taylor
Introduction

H

ume’s moral philosophy may plausibly be construed as a version of virtue
ethics. Among the central moral concepts of his theory are character,
virtue, and vice, rather than rules, duty, or obligation. The importance
of character focuses theoretical attention on the emotions and other affective
aspects of our moral psychology that are essential to our developing an appreciation of what is worthwhile and praiseworthy. Yet a conspicuous feature of Hume’s
ethical theory is an emphasis on moral sentiment as the means by which we evaluate character as virtuous or vicious. His theory thus contrasts with another version
of virtue ethics, one often associated with Aristotle. Aristotelian virtue ethics
focuses on the perspective of the virtuous agent, examining how one becomes
virtuous, and the role of virtue in practical deliberation and living a good life. In
contrast, Hume is much more interested in how we recognize and evaluate traits
of character than in how we become virtuous, or in how virtue relates to deliberation and living well.
The difference between the Aristotelian and Humean versions of virtue ethics
is not simply one of emphasis, that is, of seeing deliberation as more important
than evaluation, or vice versa. Rather, the two theories have different views about
moral knowledge: what moral knowledge is, how we acquire it, and what it is for.
The Aristotelian view focuses on the virtuous agent’s ethical capacities, especially
moral perception and deliberation. For Aristotle, the fully virtuous agent has the
wisdom needed to deliberate well, which is in turn required in order to lead a
flourishing life. The virtuous agent sets the standard for moral knowledge, and is
a model for others to imitate as they cultivate their own virtuous character. The
Aristotelian’s emphasis on practical reason thus grounds an agent-centered view
of moral knowledge. In contrast, Hume’s theory explains how we recognize character traits as virtues and vices, and how we form standards for our sentiment-based
appraisals of these traits. The identification and valuation of character traits is a
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social process, requiring conversation, and at times, negotiation and debate. On
this view, moral knowledge about which characters are praiseworthy or blame
worthy is a collectively established resource.
Seeing moral evaluation as a social practice distinguishes Hume from
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers with whom, because they also
focus on the moral sentiments, he is often associated. Certainly part of the explanation for Hume’s emphasis on sentiment and evaluation lies in the historical
context in which he was thinking about morality. Hume engages directly with an
important debate of his day that emerged in response to Hobbes’s “selfish” theory.
Those who disagreed with the “selfish” theory of Hobbes and Mandeville divided
into two general camps: moral intellectualists, such as Ralph Cudworth and Samuel
Clarke, and moral sense theorists, such as Francis Hutcheson and Shaftesbury. In
many respects, Hume agrees with the moral sense camp, and follows Hutcheson
in setting out the inadequacies of the intellectualist position as well as criticizing
the selfish theory. He agrees with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson that we have strong
social motives, and that our approval of these motives reinforces both our appreciation of virtue and our motivation to act virtuously (see Shaftesbury 2000;
Hutcheson 2002, 2004). It is the reflexive approval of social motives that makes
the emphasis on evaluation important for the moral sense theorists. But rather
than appealing to an innate moral sense that reflexively approves of benevolence,
Hume argues that sympathy, our natural capacity to participate in one another’s
pains and pleasures, is the source for our moral approbation of a variety of virtues.
Hume sees it as an evident benefit of his approach that grounding the moral sentiments in sympathy can accommodate a broad range of virtues: convention-based
virtues of justice and etiquette, self-regarding virtues, even some talents and some
immediately agreeable virtues such as wit or eloquence, as well as the social virtues
recognized by his moral sense predecessors. The appeal to sympathy also means
that Hume must explain how we correct and cultivate our moral “taste.” His
explanation of the cultivation of our moral taste yields an account of moral know
ledge as the product of shared reflection, scrutiny, and conversation.
In this essay, I first examine Hume’s understanding of character and its importance for us. I then turn to our natural responses to various character traits, and
Hume’s account of how sympathy with those responses is the source of the moral
sentiments. Hume invokes the notion of a standard of virtue in order to undercut
objections that sentiments with their source in sympathy will lack an objectivity
that we think our moral evaluations should have. So next I look in some detail at
the kind of errors to which sympathy makes us susceptible, and at how the strategies we use to correct these errors renders sympathy self-correcting. After then
considering how our moral sentiments have authority for us, particularly when
they are the verdicts of those who have cultivated an active habit of moral evaluation, I consider more fully why moral knowledge is, on the Humean view, a collectively-established social resource that is important for moral education and
illustration, moral motivation, and our sense of moral identity.
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The Importance of Character
Hume insists that character is the proper object of moral evaluation. We may
sometimes consider actions independently of motive and character, looking instead,
for example, at the consequences of a certain course of conduct. But Hume argues
that what really makes a difference for us is a person’s character. A person’s reasons
for acting typically reflect the characteristic ways in which she responds to situations. Her actions thus show us the kind of character she has. Suppose two people
each present me with a gift of money, with the happy result that I now have enough
wealth to start a business. Yet, if one gave me the money to curry favor further
down the line whereas the other genuinely cared about my being successful in the
new business venture, this difference in motive, and not just the gift of money,
influences how I feel about the two people. The first one acts out of self-interest
and perhaps manipulatively, while the second acts from beneficence. I am not
indifferent to the fact that they did not act from the same motive, and I naturally
feel more good will towards the beneficent person. As Hume notes, when “a good
disposition is attended with good fortune, which renders it really beneficial to
society, it gives stronger pleasure to the spectator, and is attended with a more
lively sympathy” (T 3.3.1.21; SBN 585). But in spite of our warmer response to
such fortunate virtue, we do not say that it is more virtuous than the benevolent
disposition without the fortune. Hence character, the quality or motive from
which someone acted, has an influence on our moral responses to the person
independently of the consequences of her action.
Nevertheless, Hume indicates that careful judgment is needed to identify accurately traits of character. We are frequently partial towards those who benefit us,
especially when it occurs on a regular basis. And just as we naturally love our
benefactors, we tend to hate those who harm us. We thus may think well of our
friends and allies who act with our interests in view, even if they are pernicious to
others (as Hume writes, our ally’s cruel conduct “is an evil inseparable from war”).
And we may likewise deny a good character to our enemies, however much they
benefit those in their charge; “we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent.” This “method of thinking” with respect to our friends
and foes is one that “runs thro’ common life” (T 2.2.3.2; SBN 348). We also tend
to find people disagreeable by their “deformity or folly,” however unintended on
their part (T 2.2.3.4; SBN 348). As Hume notes, “this is a clear proof, that,
independent of the opinion of iniquity, any harm or uneasiness has a natural tendency to excite our hatred, and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon which
we may justify and establish the passion” (T 2.2.3.9; SBN 351). Even accidental
injuries tend to elicit a first, natural response of anger. To counter these common
tendencies, we must distinguish between the pain or pleasure someone causes us
and their “particular design and intention” (T 2.2.3.3; SBN 348). The intention
connects the person’s actions with something yet more “durable in him”

virtue and the evaluation of character

279

(T 2.2.3.4; SBN 348). Moreover, knowing whether someone has contempt for
me or holds me in esteem influences my own love or hatred of him.
A person’s attitudes, actions, and conduct show us what sort of character she
has. Hume describes our actions and attitudes as “signs” of our character. Since
we cannot directly “look within to find the moral quality” of an agent, we must
“fix our attention on actions, as on external signs  .  .  .  but  .  .  .  the ultimate object
of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc’d them” (T 3.2.1.2–4;
SBN 477–8). Not only someone’s actions, but also her “words, or even wishes
and sentiments,” as well the responses of others to her actions and attitudes, allow
us to make inferences about her character (T 3.3.1.5; SBN 575). Character consists
of what Hume refers to as “durable mental qualities,” settled habits of feeling and
dispositions to respond and act in certain ways. Some of these are instinctive, and
so will appear in some degree in most people. Hume identifies resentment, benevolence, and care of young children as among our instinctive propensities, ones we
expect to move most people to respond in particular situations (T 2.3.3.8; SBN
417). He also characterizes some of the passions and what we think of as moods
as traits of character. Such passions as kindness, anger, melancholy, hopefulness,
or fear, can become established ways of responding to situations or other people.
These become “durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole
conduct, and enter into the personal character” (T 3.3.1.4; SBN 575) (McIntyre
1990; Baier 1991).
Hume presents a fourfold classification of the virtues. A virtue is a character trait
that is useful or agreeable, either to the person who possesses it or to others (T
3.3.1.30; SBN 590). The socially useful virtues include both artificial and natural
virtues. The artificial virtues, which include honesty, loyalty, and fidelity, are primarily those we associate with the conventions of justice that establish our legal and
civil obligations and rights. Hume also counts among the artificial or conventiondependent virtues the chastity and modesty required of women to help to preserve
marital unions and families; gallantry on the part of men is likewise artificial. The
natural social virtues include “meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency,
moderation, equity” (T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578). Among the virtues characteristic of
those who are “good and benevolent” we find “humanity, compassion, gratitude,
friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality” (T 3.3.3.3; SBN 603). People
who are “great” rather than good possess traits such as constancy, fortitude, and
magnanimity, which suit them for a life of leadership and heroism (T 3.3.4.3; SBN
608). Traits useful for their possessor include “prudence, temperance, frugality,
industry, assiduity, enterprise, dexterity” (T 3.3.1.24; SBN 587). The need for
modesty in our dealings with others makes an internal “due degree of pride”
perhaps the most important self-regarding virtue (T 3.3.2.8; SBN 596).
The inclusion of self-regarding as well as other-regarding traits makes Hume’s
catalogue of virtues broader than that of moral sense theorists such as Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson. For the moral sense theorists, the moral sense is almost an instinctive approval of various forms of benevolence. By grounding the moral sentiments
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in sympathy, Hume is able to include all the mental qualities that produce pleasure
and pain for their possessor or others. Significantly, not all virtues tend to the
public good. We also experience an immediate approval for such qualities as wit
or an easy manner. These qualities are pleasing to others and we sympathize with
that pleasure without considering whether wit or an easy manner promote the
public good.
Two other features of Hume’s catalogue are also noteworthy: the inclusion of
traits some might label as talents or abilities rather than virtues, and the inclusion
of traits that we may not be able to acquire through our voluntary efforts. Hume
notes that some people might insist that the advantageous qualities such as industry, perseverance, patience, temperance, or frugality, required for success in the
world, are natural abilities rather than virtues. But he responds that “in common
life and conversation,” we tend to praise whichever qualities please us and blame
those that make us uneasy whether they are social virtues or self-regarding ones
(T 3.3.4.4; SBN 609). Someone might object that our approval of talents or abilities is different in kind from that of our moral approval, but Hume responds that
there are different kinds of approval even for some of the agreed-upon virtues. A
second objection might be that talents are something bestowed by fortune rather
than acquired. But people may not be able through their voluntary efforts to cultivate patience, or courage, or a number of other virtues, or for that matter, overcome a quick temper or some other vice. Regardless of whether it is voluntary,
the quality produces pleasure or pain, and so earns our praise or blame.
Finally, notice that Hume suggests that there is broad agreement on which traits
of character are virtues and which are vices. This agreement spans cultures and
historical epochs; so, for example, “we give the same approbation to the same
moral qualities in China as in England” (T 3.3.1.14; SBN 580). In his later works,
in the second Enquiry, “A dialogue,” and some of the essays, Hume changes his
views about the universality of the recognition and valuation of character traits,
and argues that there are culturally and historically specific virtues and vices. But
even in the Treatise, Hume himself surely knew that his views about what we count
as virtues would not garner widespread support. Including talents is controversial
for theological or other views that place a value on free will. And some would
surely find it frivolous to count qualities such as wit or eloquence as virtues.
Nevertheless, Hume has given us a good explanation for why we can agree on the
reasons for valuing or despising these different kinds of traits: we approve of useful
or agreeable traits and disapprove of those that are harmful or disagreeable.

Sympathy, the Indirect Passions,
and Moral Sentiment
Traits of character comprise one element of a larger set of relatively durable features
of persons that we regard as having particular importance for us. The other features
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include physical appearance and abilities, wealth, power and other external advantages, or the lack of these (see T 2.1.7–10). Their importance for us is shown by
our strong response to them, feelings of love or hatred when we find them in
others, and pride or humility when they concern ourselves. Hume describes the
passions of love, hatred, pride, and humility as “indirect” passions. The indirect
passions are not simple, direct responses to pleasure or pain, but rather are complex
passions, always directed towards persons and signaling our recognition and valuation of one or more of these durable features that contribute to making the person
who she is (Ainslie 1999). We might think of the indirect passions as evaluative
attitudes, that is, belief-informed, affective responses that express our sense of
someone’s worth in virtue of one or more of these features. While we may love
someone just because he is related to us, the indirect passions are typically produced in response to the person’s possession of some feature such as good character, to which we independently attach value. So a person’s virtue, beauty, or
wealth makes her lovable to us, and is something in which she appropriately
takes pride.
Hume’s explanation of moral evaluation draws an intimate connection between
moral sentiment and these four key indirect passions. First, he suggests that our
most natural response to the characters of those people closest to us, including
our family, friends, and colleagues, will be an indirect passion: some form of love
towards those with a virtuous character, and some form of hatred towards those
exhibiting vice. In Book 2, Hume describes virtue and vice as “the most obvious
causes” of the indirect passions (T 2.1.7.2; SBN 295). In Book 3, in the section
on the natural virtues and vices, he writes:
Now since every quality in ourselves or others, which gives pleasure, always causes
pride or love; as every one, that produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: It
follows, that these two particulars are to be consider’d as equivalent, with regard to
our mental qualities, virtue and the power of producing love or pride, vice and the
power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, therefore, we must judge of
the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, which
causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility. (T 3.3.1.3;
SBN 574)

We love the virtuous among our friends, family, and associates, and likewise we
take pride in our own virtue. Our natural response to vice in those with whom
we have dealings is hatred, while our own vices cause us to feel humility.
Second, our perception of virtue and vice depends on our capacity to sympathize with these natural responses. Hume describes sympathy as a principle of the
imagination that makes it possible for us to communicate our passions, sentiments,
and even our opinions to one another. Sympathy can work in an immediate way,
like a contagion, causing us to laugh, for example, just because someone else is
laughing. More typically, though, sympathy allows us to interpret and respond to
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the passions of others. The passions are perceptions of the mind, and since we do
not have access to one another’s minds, we must infer the passions of others, just
as we infer character traits (some of which are passions), from their “signs.” We
read the passions and sentiments of others from their facial expressions, conversation, demeanor, and conduct. From a person’s outward signs, and drawing on our
own passionate experience, we form a belief about what she is feeling. As Hume
observes, there is a “general resemblance” between ourselves and others, so that
“we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or
other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves” (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318). The similarity between oneself and others explains why the force of sympathy goes beyond
that of custom. We have a lively conception of ourselves, which “is always intimately present with us,” so that we conceive “with a like vivacity of conception”
whatever is related to us (T 2.1.11.4; SBN 317). Sympathy conveys the vivacity
from the conception we have of ourselves to the idea we have of the person’s
passion, converting that idea into a passion.
Sympathizing with the passions or situations of someone else does not involve
imagining oneself in place of the other. Indeed, our sympathetic participation in
the passionate lives of others broadens our own passionate experience. For example,
sympathizing with another “takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same
pleasure or uneasiness” that the person experiences, which in turn frequently
moves us to respond to the situations of others (T 3.3.1.12; SBN 579). This point
is important with respect to moral evaluation since our sympathetic appreciation
of others’ responses helps us to focus properly on traits of character instead of on
consequences or our own interests. Sympathy may thus be thought of as having
in part an epistemological function. It helps us move beyond our own concerns
and gain a clearer view of what characters are like.
We should also note that sympathetic pains and pleasures can be disinterested.
For example, when we sympathize with the pleasure the rich man gets from his
wealth, our sympathetically produced pleasure, which in this case is an esteem or
admiration, does not depend on our expecting to benefit from his wealth. Sympathy
is the source of the different kinds of disinterested approval or disapproval we
direct towards others. This single source for our different sentiments has what
Hume sees as a distinct advantage with respect to the moral evaluation of character
since the catalogue of virtues expands to include self-regarding as well as social
traits, convention-based requirements for just conduct as well as good manners,
and those mental abilities that are gifts of fortune rather than acquired traits.
Moreover, without this capacity for sympathy, we would typically respond to
others when their conduct and character affected ourselves (or those so close to
us that we regard their pains and pleasures as bearing directly on our own). Hume
makes the point more clearly in the second Enquiry, arguing that if we lacked this
capacity to sympathize with the pains and pleasures of others, we would likewise
be indifferent to vice and virtue (EPM 5.40; SBN 226). In short, sympathy is the
source of the moral sentiments.
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Above, I said that there is an intimate connection between the indirect passions
and the moral sentiments insofar as it is our sympathy with the former that produces the latter. It is worth noting that some commentators argue that Hume is
advancing the view that the moral sentiments are themselves calm forms of love
and hatred. The main textual evidence for this view includes the claim that virtue
is the power of producing love (T 3.3.1.3; SBN 574); the claim that when we
take up a shared moral perspective it makes possible a calm determination of the
passions (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583); and the claim that our moral approbation and
blame “is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred” (T 3.3.5.1;
SBN 614). Drawing on this evidence, Pall Árdal (1966) argues both that the
indirect passions of love and hatred, on the one hand, and the moral sentiments
on the other, have similar causes, namely, certain mental qualities, and that the
moral sentiments are objective variants of the indirect passions. Philip Mercer
(1972) endorses Árdal’s argument, and adds that by taking up the general point
of view (whereby we overlook our own interest and compensate for distance) we
form a habit of objective judgment. Christine Korsgaard (1999) agrees with Árdal
and Mercer that moral approbation is a species of love, and she also argues that
Hume appeals to the shared moral perspective to establish a normative standard
for love. She thinks it is possible to read Hume as claiming that virtue is the
cause of love, and that while we do not always love the virtuous even from the
common point of view, that evaluative perspective nevertheless shows us that we
ought to love the virtuous since they are worthy of our love and entitled to
our good will.
Nevertheless, the text leaves considerable room for disagreement with the
interpretation of the moral sentiments as calm indirect passions. Annette Baier
argues that while “moral sentiment is at least as complicated as any indirect
passion,” it is a “reversal” of the indirect passions scheme, since it takes characters
rather than persons as its object (Baier 1991: 134). In contrast to our loving
someone because she is witty, the moral sentiment is our approval of wit, whomever we find possessed of it (see also Norton 1982). Baier also argues that Hume
proves more skeptical than we might have expected about the motivational influence of the moral sentiment since he claims it is sufficient merely to express our
praise and blame (1991: 185–6). He does not require us either to love those we
find praiseworthy, or to show good will to the virtuous, although sometimes
we may.

Sympathy, Sentiment and Impartial
Evaluation of Character
In Book 2, Hume introduces a distinction between the calm and violent impressions of reflection, writing: “of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity
in action, composition, and external objects.” The sense of beauty and deformity
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in action is our sense of morality, or moral “taste.” One reason for designating as
calm the sentiments that arise from our sense of beauty is that they generally feel
faint, even “imperceptible.” “This division” of the passions is, however, “far from
being exact” (T 2.1.1.3; SBN 275). Under various conditions, the violent passions
may produce no felt emotion whereas the moral sentiments may be felt intensely.
Indeed, our moral sentiments are sometimes among our strongest feelings: “there
is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor any which
gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and treacherous” (T 3.1.2.2; SBN
470). We find heroic characters “dazling,” and “cannot refuse” them our admiration (T 3.3.2.15; SBN 600). Cruelty is “the most detested of all vices,” and arouses
in us “a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion” (T 3.3.3.8;
SBN 605). We also tend to have stronger moral sentiments towards those who
resemble the people with whom we usually interact. When a virtuous character is
distant from us, but he and his acquaintances resemble those in our own community, their situation “interests us strongly by sympathy” so that we correspondingly feel a strong approval of his character. In such cases, “we approve of his
character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those who
have a more particular connexion with him” (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602).
But our moral sentiments may be weak, and we may make a moral judgment
about someone’s character without feeling any sentiment at all. Variations in our
sentiments of praise and blame occur because each of us remains confined, to some
extent, to the perspective of our present situation. If confinement to our present
perspective were entire, it would be impossible for us either to reach agreement
with others or even to make consistent appraisals of our own actions over the
course of our life. Fortunately, our capacity for reflection enables us to correct
our sympathy and we can “in our thoughts place ourselves” in “some steady and
general points of view” (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581). From these perspectives we “form
some general inalterable standard” to which our moral sentiments should conform
(T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602). A second reason for regarding the moral sentiments as calm
is that they arise from this process of reflection and correction, making our moral
evaluations similar to the warranted judgments of the understanding.
From our present perspective, our evaluations of character vary, owing to a
failure to regulate our sympathetic responses. Hume identifies three different
causes of error, deriving from our natural partiality and the influence of the associative principles on sympathy. What I will designate the “remoteness” error occurs
in cases where the agent is located at a distance from us so that our sympathy is
too weak to produce the appropriate sentiment of praise or blame. The error of
“countervailing interest” arises when our own interest or partiality is strong so
that we confuse our interested love or hate of someone with moral approval or
blame. The “consequentialist” error results from our evaluating the consequences
of someone’s having acted or not, rather than her character, so that we fail to
separate the virtuous or vicious disposition from the accidental circumstances
attending it.
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The Errors of Remoteness and
Countervailing Interest
Let us look at the remoteness error and the error of countervailing interest
together, since Hume offers the same solution to them. We have seen that our
moral sentiments arise when we sympathize with the pains and pleasures of those
affected by the character of an agent. Although the general resemblance between
others and ourselves makes sympathy possible, sympathy is influenced by the
associative principles of resemblance, cause and effect, and contiguity. The influence of these principles makes sympathy “very variable.” So we sympathize more
easily with the passions and opinions of people who resemble us, and with those
to whom we are related (Hume regards familial relationship as a “species” of
causation). Others’ nearness or distance, whether physical or temporal distance,
or a more figurative distance based on culture, interests, or values, frequently
affects our sympathy: “we sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than
with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With
our countrymen, than with foreigners” (T 3.3.1.14; SBN 580). We naturally
sympathize more easily with, and so feel a more lively praise or blame for an agent
who is near to us than we do for someone who is physically or temporally remote
from us. The problem is that when an agent and the people affected by her character are distant from us, “our sympathy is proportionably weaker, and our praise
or blame fainter and more doubtful” (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602). But it would be
inconsistent to approve of a character trait in the agent close to us while not finding
as admirable the same trait in a person who is distant from us. Hume acknowledges
that we judge the two characters to be equally admirable, even if our sympathy is
stronger and so produces a stronger sentiment in the case that is closer to hand.
So he must explain how sympathy and sentiment can be the source of our moral
admiration if our sympathy-based sentiments vary with distance.
A second failure in moral evaluation occurs when we fail to put aside a concern
for our own interest or the interests of those to whom we are partial, and judge
only from our own narrow perspective. As we saw in the section “The Importance
of Character,” failure to correct self-interest or partiality may prevent us from
seeing the vices of our friends or acknowledging the virtues of our enemies. We
generally think of courage as admirable whether we are reading about it in a historical narrative or witnessing it in the local heroes of our own community. But
self-interest and prejudice lead us to find displeasing the bravery of our enemy and
condemn it as blameworthy, even though others find it praiseworthy. In such cases,
the passions of love and hate that arise from our interested perspective “are apt
to be confounded” with moral sentiments, since these passions and sentiments
“naturally run into one another.” In other words, we mistake our interested hatred
for moral blame: because the person is our enemy and her bravery works in opposition to our own interest, we tend, in our uneasiness, to think of her actions as
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villainous. But it does not follow that the two different kinds of disfavor, interested
and moral, are not distinct. The difficulty is sufficiently real, however, that it
takes a person “of temper and judgment” to avoid “these illusions” (T 3.1.2.4;
SBN 472).
Hume’s emphasis on temper as well as judgment indicates the importance of
both feeling appropriately and reasoning soundly. Responses of admiration or
condemnation based on our partiality or prejudice do not count as moral evaluations. “ ’Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to
our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates
it morally good or evil” (T 3.1.2.4; SBN 472). The solution to the remoteness
error requires us to reconstruct imaginatively the agent’s circle of associates,
making the moral picture more vivid so that we sympathize more readily. Hume
suggests that the corrective process for the remoteness error is as natural as correcting our judgment about the size of an object viewed from a distance in spite
of the apparent sensible evidence. He notes, “such corrections are common with
regard to all the senses; and indeed ‘twere impossible we cou’d ever make use of
language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the
momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situation” (T 3.3.1.16;
SBN 582). In the case of countervailing interest, the moral evaluator remains
focused on his own interest. When we find ourselves doing this, we must “loosen”
ourselves from our “first station,” that of self-interest, and make the moral picture
more inclusive (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583). Again, we sympathize with the effects of
an agent’s character on himself and his circle of acquaintances. And we
consider not whether the persons, affected by the qualities, be our acquaintance or
strangers, countrymen or foreigners. Nay, we over-look our own interest in those
general judgments; and blame not a man for opposing us in any of our pretensions,
when his own interest is particularly concerned. (T 3.3.1.17; SBN 582)

When we make the effort to broaden or reconstruct imaginatively the agent’s
circle of acquaintances, the immediate feelings that arise from our present perspective may nevertheless remain unchanged. We may continue to feel angry or humiliated, and so feel hatred for our enemy since her bravery opposes our interest. But
by taking up this more general point of view, by discounting the strength of our
own interest, and considering instead the effects of her bravery from a wider perspective than that of our own, we come to recognize that our immediate response
is interested rather than moral. We can thus express verbally, if not through
sincerely felt sentiment, praise for the merit of our enemy’s bravery. In this way, we
judge the two characters to be equally admirable, even if our sympathy is stronger
and so produces a stronger sentiment in the case to which we are partial.
To correct both the remoteness error and the error of countervailing interest,
we must adopt a shared perspective on the agent’s character. Hume identifies two
problems with this variability of sympathy that he thinks motivate us to correct it

virtue and the evaluation of character

287

by taking up a shared perspective. First, our own situation “is in continual fluctuation,” so that an individual currently distant from us may in time become a familiar
acquaintance. Second, our own situation frequently differs from that of others,
leading to conflict with one another. Rather than relying on our own “peculiar”
perspective, we need to find a common point of view with others if we want to
“converse together on any reasonable terms” (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581). We fix our
view of what someone’s character is like by adopting what Hume refers to as a
“common point of view.” Here is a succinct description of the process of taking
up a common perspective.
Every person’s pleasure and interest being different, ‘tis impossible men cou’d ever
agree in their sentiments and judgments unless they chose some common point of
view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear
the same to all of them. Now in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure,
which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character is examin’d; or that of persons, who have a connexion with him. And tho’ such
interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant
and universal, they counter-ballance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted
in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that
particular feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend. (T 3.3.1.30;
SBN 590)1

The common point of view helps us to move beyond our present and particular
situation, and so to disregard the variations in sympathy and sentiment due to
vivacity or distance. By sympathizing with the responses of those whose interests
are affected by someone’s character or with the person’s own sense of pride or
humility with respect to his character, we extend our concern to the perspective
of those most familiar with the character. Their responses are “more constant and
universal,” so that they “counter-balance” our own interests “even in practice.”
Taking up this shared perspective has a steadying or stabilizing effect on our judgment. The responses of the agent and her acquaintances “are alone admitted in
speculation as the standard of virtue of morality,” since they fix our view of what
the agent’s character is really like and thus help us to calibrate our sense of someone’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. By following this method of evaluation, we gradually form a “general unalterable standard” to which our moral
sentiments should conform, so that our moral evaluations become correspondingly
“constant and establish’d” (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602).

The Consequentialist Error
Lastly, Hume discusses cases where our sympathy is not activated at all. What I
am calling the consequentialist error reflects our tendency to respond to the results
of someone’s action, rather than her character, so that we fail respond to an agent’s
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character when she is prevented from acting as she characteristically would. It is
true that admirable or harmful character traits, when manifested in action, tend
to produce valuable or harmful results, respectively. But it is the character trait
towards which we direct our moral admiration or blame. So it is a mistake to
regard the results of someone’s action as harmful or beneficial independently of
the character that produced it. Similarly, it is a mistake to disregard someone’s
character just because she was unable to act as she characteristically would, and
there are no consequences – those effects comprising the responses of her acquaintances to her character – with which to sympathize. Now so far, we have focused
on cases where a moral evaluator uses imagination to reconstruct the agent’s circle
of acquaintances, and sympathy to participate in the responses of all the members
of the circle. But Hume’s discussion of this third error shows that reconstructing
and sympathizing with the whole of the agent’s circle may not by itself be sufficient
to produce the appropriate moral assessment, since in cases involving the consequentialist error there are few, if any, “effects” or “signs” of character in evidence
for us to sympathize with.
The solution to the consequentialist error lies in adopting another kind of
“steady and general” perspective. In Book 1, Hume argued that we distinguish
the “superfluous” or “accidental” circumstances of an event from the properly
efficacious causes by employing the general rules associated with the understanding
and sound reasoning (T 1.3.13). We also rely on these general rules in the cases
involving the consequentialist error, although in this case they produce a moral
sentiment rather than a judgment of the understanding. From experience, we
know the usual effects of benevolence and so are able to judge the benevolent
disposition as if it were a “compleat” cause, even when it cannot be exercised to
produce the action usual to such a disposition. Because the “character is  .  .  .  fitted
to be beneficial to society, the imagination passes easily from the cause to the
effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances wanting to
render the cause a compleat one” (T 3.3.1.20; SBN 584). On reflection, we still
approve of the benevolent person even though she is currently in reduced circumstances. As Hume puts it, “virtue in rags is still virtue” (T 3.3.1.19; SBN 584).
One might object here that you cannot be benevolent without something to give,
but that is not really right. If you are poor but benevolently disposed you would
give if you could, and you can certainly express benevolent affections; in the same
way, if no one stands in need of your beneficence that does not mean you do not
have the trait, but rather that you have no reason to exercise it. It is on the other
hand usually true that if you have something to give and you lack the benevolent
trait, then beneficence will not result.
In cases involving the consequentialist error, Hume argues that the moral
evaluator’s sentiments are among a set of passions belonging to the imagination.
In Book 2, Hume describes desires and inclinations “which go no farther than
the imagination, and are rather the faint shadows and images of passions, rather
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than any real affections” (T 2.3.10.5; SBN 450). For example, we will be pleased
with the utility of a well-built city, arising from a sympathy with the pleasure of
the inhabitants, even though we have no affection for them. In cases where the
signs of character are not in evidence, the moral sentiments depend on envisioning
in our imagination the typical efficacy of a particular character trait, an efficacy not
actually in evidence, so that we are “mov’d by degrees of liveliness and strength,
which are inferior to belief, and independent of the real existence of their objects
(T 3.3.1.20; SBN 584). By imaginatively representing to ourselves the effects of
benevolence, the sentiment aroused does not feel the same as those elicited by
actual benevolent action, but it is “of a like species.” The feeling of these two
species of sentiment is sufficiently different, however, that they can be contrary,
yet coexist without destroying each other: “These emotions are so different in
their feeling, that they may often be contrary, without destroying each other.”
Hume characterizes these sentiments of the imagination as not forceful enough
to “controul our passions” and actions, but as capable of influencing “our taste.”
Notice that because they arise from the corrective effects of general rules on the
imagination, and are thereby rendered more stable and consistent, their influence
on our taste is authoritative in a way the immediate and unreflective passionate
response to the actual consequences is not; as Hume observes, “the imagination
adheres to the general views of things, and distinguishes betwixt the feelings they
produce, and those which arise from our particular and momentary situation”
(T 3.3.1.23; SBN 586).

The Authority of the Moral Sentiments
In correcting each of these three kinds of error – remoteness, countervailing interest, and consequentialist – we often continue to experience those feelings arising
from our particular and present perspective: whatever is near to us, affects our
own interest, or is perceived vividly, and has an immediate influence on our passions. In our natural and immediate consideration of the consequences, we may,
for example, feel disappointment about the ineffective virtuous agent; or we may
feel strong love for a benevolent companion but not be moved by an equally
benevolent person who is a stranger to us. Attention to the passages where Hume
talks about correcting our responses from a general point of view shows him
repeatedly making clear that it is not necessarily our passions or sentiments that
get corrected. “The passions do not readily follow the determination of our judgment,” and “the heart does not always take part” with our corrections, “or regulate its love and hatred by them” (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583; T 3.3.3.2;SBN 603).
Our present situation keeps us to some extent self-interested or partial, or focused
on the immediacy of what happens before us. In “our thoughts,” however, we
adopt a more general perspective, and although “the passions do not always follow
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our corrections  .  .  .  these corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract
notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the
degrees of vice and virtue” (T 3.3.1.21; SBN 585).
Hume’s phrase “abstract notions” is one of several that make moral judgment
sound more like the verdict of reason than of moral taste or sentiment. For
example, we disregard the variations in sympathy and sentiment “in our general
decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike.” We learn to
correct “our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn or inalterable.”
In attempting to “over-look our own interest in those general judgments; and
blame not a man for opposing us in any of our pretensions,” and making “allowance for a certain degree of selfishness in men,” we arrive at “the general principle
of blame or praise.” If these reflections fail to correct our passions, we say “that
reason requires such an impartial conduct” on our part. Or when a sympathetically
produced sentiment is weaker than interest or partiality, it nevertheless is “equally
conformable to our calm and general principles,” and “ ’tis said to have an equal
authority over our reason, and to command our judgment and opinion”
(T 3.3.1.16–18; SBN 582–3).
But Hume insists, “the approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not
deriv’d from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a
moral taste” (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581. See also T 3.3.1.27; SBN 589). And although
he uses the language of reason, he links our reflection-informed moral judgment
with the calm passions and sympathy rather than reason. He reminds us of “what
we formerly said concerning that reason, which is able to oppose our passion; and
which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection” (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583). Our
use of the terms expressing praise or blame indicates a judgment informed by
reflection about how we would feel if we were affected by the agent’s character.
Sympathetic consideration of the love or hate of the person’s acquaintances for
him is for us a guide to his praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Hume’s reference
to what was formerly said about improperly calling reason the calm determination
of the passions is to his discussion, in the section on the origin of government,
of the strategy we use to correct our direct passions (in this case self-interest)
and determine “what is in itself preferable,” or most choiceworthy (T 3.2.7.5;
SBN 536). Our passions tend to “solicit” us and “plead in favor of whatever is
near and contiguous,” which, if we yield to them, leaves us satisfying a very
short-term interest at the expense of what is best for us in the long run (T 3.2.7.2;
SBN 534). When we consider the objects of our passions at a distance, from a
more dispassionate perspective, those vagaries that make the short term good seem
so tempting disappear, and we instead prefer what is most choiceworthy. Here, it
is through our passionate response, in this case, a reflective form of interest, or
long-term interest, that we determine what is really preferable. In the case of
moral evaluation, Hume’s claim that we would find the virtuous person lovable if
we were an acquaintance in her circle, suggests that from the reflective, shared

virtue and the evaluation of character

291

point of view we do find her admirable and praiseworthy (even if we don’t feel
love for her).
Hume draws some initial parallels between the calm passions and the traditional
conception of reason in the third part of Book 2. I want to survey some of those
points briefly because they point to the possibility of constructing an account of
good moral judgment as itself a virtue. Hume does not explicitly set out such an
account in the Treatise, although he does in the second Enquiry and in the essay
“Of the standard of taste” (Taylor 2002). We already noted in the section
“Sympathy, the Indirect Passions, and Moral Sentiment,” that some of our passions are naturally calm and so are mistaken for the conclusions of reason. As he
wraps up his discussion of the will and the passions in T 2.3.8, Hume reviews the
distinction between the calmness and violence of the passions, now explicitly
associating the calm passions with how we use the term “reason” when we are
talking about choosing good and avoiding evil.
What we commonly understand by passion, is a violent and sensible emotion of the
mind, when any good or evil is presented  .  .  .  By reason we mean affections of the
very same kind with the former; but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them, and
causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties. (T 2.3.8.13;
SBN 437)

Hume characterizes the calm passions here as like reason because they motivate
us without producing emotional agitation. But he argues that some of our calm
passions are also like reason both because they are stronger than, and hence able
to oppose their violent counterparts, and because they are reflection-informed
responses. These claims are critical to seeing how the reflective moral evaluations
we make are strong enough “to controul our taste,” if not our actions.
The account of the calm passions in Book 2 deals with the direct passions that
move us to action. These passions do not influence the will “in proportion to their
violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper.” Rather, through custom
and its “own force,” a passion can “become a settled principle of action” and “the
predominant inclination of the soul,” which no longer produces sensible agitation.
A calm passion can thus be strong, while a violent one can be weak, a “momentary
gust” that quickly subsides once it meets with opposition or uncertainty (T
2.3.4.1; SBN 418). Echoing Joseph Butler’s distinction between active, practical
habits and passive ones, Hume also argues that custom makes it easier and more
pleasant to engage in active habits, in turn giving them “new force” (T 2.3.5.5;
SBN 424). The imaginative effort involved in making moral judgments, either
from the common point of view or by relying on general rules, and the importance
of our moral judgments, together make it plausible to regard moral evaluation as
an active habit.
Finally, some of the settled calm passions that may be mistaken for reflective
reason comprise the virtue of strength of mind. Hume describes strength of mind
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as “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent,” a prevalence which
depends on the peculiar temper and disposition of the individual (T 2.3.3.10; SBN
418). Although “the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the
will  .  .  .  the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to controul them in their most furious movements” (T 2.3.8.13;
SBN 437). The moral evaluator with strength of mind will find it easier to set
aside her own interests, bring the distant characters closer, and disregard consequences in favor of character. Her moral praise or blame is informed by reflection
on the vagaries of her passions and the imagination, on the commonality of
interest among humankind, on the naturalness of being more concerned with the
characters of those who affect one, and on our tendency to get caught up in the
present and what is actually happening around us. Her resolution to stabilize her
own internal judgments of others and to converse intelligibly with others will lead
her to form an active habit of moral evaluation, and in turn cultivate a strong and
authoritative moral taste.

Moral Knowledge as a Shared Resource
Let us return now to the point I made in the introduction to this essay about
moral knowledge being a shared resource. The Humean appeal to moral sentiment
is to a cultivated form of moral response, and signals a particular way of theorizing
about the social development and character of our sense of morality. We might
regard moral evaluation as a social practice in which, ideally, everyone participates.
Because we direct our moral attention to what about a person’s character, manifested in her attitudes or conduct, has a special relevance for how well or badly
our lives go, it is important to us that others in our moral community endorse
and agree with our judgments. The standards for appropriately praising or blaming,
admiring or condemning, arise from what Hume calls an “intercourse of sentiments,” that is, from conversation and debate among the members of the moral
community (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602). From the common point of view, we give a
fair hearing to the views of others, thereby facilitating intelligible conversation.
Moral evaluators also subject their attitudes to mutual scrutiny and attempt to
reach agreement in outlook. The moral sentiments thus exhibit shared reflection
on the value of a broad range of character traits and qualities, as well as social
policies and practices, that make a difference to how well people live.
The agreement aimed for is not sheer consensus, however, but agreement in
judgment about the worth of particular traits or kinds of character. Such judgments
incorporate reflective beliefs about which character traits are virtues and which
vices. Additionally, sympathetic concern for the effects of character traits on the
interests, commitments, and lives of the agent herself or others introduces an
affective quality, a felt sentiment of pleasure or uneasiness, to moral judgment.
The common point of view and the practice of moral evaluation thus enable moral

virtue and the evaluation of character

293

evaluators to develop a moral taste, a sense of the value of particular traits or kinds
of characters.
Hume has stressed the need for internal stability, which we achieve when moral
evaluation becomes an active habit and when we are able to converse on intelligible
terms with others. The point about conversing intelligibly relates to the social
purpose served by our moral evaluations, and the importance of seeing moral
knowledge as a shared resource. As Hume puts it, our exchange of mutually intelligible sentiments “in society and conversation, makes us form some general
unalterable standard,” and our moral evaluations are renderered “sufficient for
discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre,
and in the schools” (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602). The moral sentiments attest to judgments about the worth of various character traits, and these judgments differ from
our personal loves and hates. We are interested in educating our children, in our
homes and in the schools, and in some cases from the pulpit. We want the kind
of moral education, and the institutions fostering it, to shape children’s characters
and allow “the sentiment of honour  .  .  .  [to] take root in their tender minds,” so
that they can become useful and agreeable, to themselves and others (T 3.2.2.26;
SBN 500). We want our public exemplars, for example, those on the stage and
those with social or political power, to reflect our values and shared sense of what
is good. Far from being merely subjective reactions, our moral evaluations have a
real influence on what our society looks like. It is, as Hume recognizes, crucially
important for us to make accurate identifications of character and to have a proper
appreciation of virtue and an abhorrence of vice.
The moral sentiments have a productive rather than a representative function,
and Hume famously describes them, in the second Enquiry, as “gilding and staining all natural objects” and raising “in a manner a new creation” (EPM Appendix
1.21; SBN 294). We direct these sentiments towards certain aspects of persons,
their “mental qualities” or character traits, as these are exhibited in conduct, attitudes, or policies. We noted earlier that character traits have a special relevance for
how well we attend to a range of needs and concerns important to our living
together with some degree of success. Through our actions and attitudes we
establish our character and earn a reputation with others. As the Enquiry claim
about the moral sentiments gilding or staining characters suggests, the appraisal
of our character and conduct by others not only contributes to our reputation,
but also informs our sense of our own character. Those of us who are trustworthy
and do our part in society will merit admiration, and may sometimes receive the
love and good will of others. Hume suggests that “the most considerable effect
that virtue and vice have upon the human mind” is, in the case of virtue, to elicit
love and pride as well as admiration, and in the case of vice, to arouse hatred and
humility in addition to moral disapproval (T 3.1.2.5; SBN 473).
In cultivating the proper appreciation for what is praiseworthy about someone’s
character, we can also turn the practice of moral appraisal on our own character.
Virtuous character is a particularly durable source of pride. Our “peace and inward
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satisfaction” depend on our cultivating a virtuous character, as well as moral taste,
so that our mind can “bear its own survey” (T 3.3.6.6; SBN 620). Our appreciation of virtue and blame of vice may thus be deployed as practical attitudes that
influence our own choices and conduct.

Note
1

See also the discussion at T 3.3.1.14–18; SBN 580–3. At T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602, Hume
describes slightly differently the process of taking up a common point of view. He is
here considering the qualities that make someone a “good” person. These are the qualities that make us useful and agreeable to those in our “narrow circle” of friends, family,
neighbors, and colleagues. Hume notes that we expect most people to be concerned
about those closest to them. When we sympathize with the narrow circle of an agent
distant from us, our sympathy is less lively than the concern we feel for those in our
own circle. Nonetheless, we extrapolate from our own situation or that of those with
whom we easily sympathize. When we encounter cases resembling those with which
we’re familiar, we know from reflection that we would find someone equally as worthy
or harmful were we a member of the distant agent’s circle. By this strategy of extrapolation, we “arrive at a more constant and establish’d judgment” about the value of various
characters. Again, our judgments may fail to regulate our sentiments and, yet the former
are “sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on
the theatre, and in the schools.”
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